Victory for Venezuela's Socialists in Crucial Elections

Victory for Venezuela's Socialists in Crucial Elections

November 2008

James Petras

The pro-Chavez United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) won 72% of
the governorships in the November 23, 2008 elections and 58% of the
popular vote, dumbfounding the predictions of most of the
pro-capitalist pollsters and the vast majority of the mass media who
favored the opposition.

PSUV candidates defeated incumbent opposition governors in three
states (Guaro, Sucre, Aragua) and lost two states (Miranda and
Tachira). The opposition retained the governorship in a tourist
center (Nueva Esparta) and won in Tachira, a state bordering
Colombia, Carabobo and the oil state of Zulia, as well as scoring an
upset victory in the populous state of Miranda and taking the
mayoralty district of the capital, Caracas. The socialist victory was
especially significant because the voter turnout of 65% exceeded all
previous non-presidential elections. The prediction by the propaganda
pollsters that a high turnout would favor the opposition also
reflected wishful thinking.

The significance of the socialist victory is clear if we put it in a
comparative historical context:

1. Few if any government parties in Europe, North or South American
have retained such high levels of popular support in free and open
elections.

2. The PSUV retained its high level of support in the context of
several radical economic measures, including the nationalization of
major cement, steel, financial and other private capitalist
monopolies.

3. The Socialists won despite the 70% decline in oil prices (from
$140 to $52 dollars a barrel), Venezuela's principle source of export
earnings, and largely because the government maintained most of its
funding for its social programs.

4. The electorate was more selective in its voting decisions
regarding Chavista candidates ? rewarding candidates who performed
adequately in providing government services and punishing those who
ignored or were unresponsive to popular demands. While President
Chavez campaigned for all the Socialist candidates, voters did not
uniformly follow his lead where they had strong grievances against
local Chavista incumbents, as was the case with outgoing Governor
Disdado Cabello of Miranda and the Mayor of the Capital District of
Caracas. Socialist victories were mostly the result of a deliberate,
class interest based vote and not simply a reflex identification with
President Chavez.

5. The decisive victory of the PSUV provides the basis for
confronting the deepening collapse of world capitalism with socialist
measures, instead of pouring state funds to rescue bankrupt
capitalist banks, commercial and manufacturing enterprises. The
collapse of capitalism facilitates the socialization of most of the
key economic sectors. Most Venezuelan firms are heavily indebted to
the state and local banks. The Chavez government can ask the firms to
repay their debts or handover the keys ? in effect bringing about a
painless and eminently legal transition to socialism.

The election results point to deepening polarization between the hard
right and the socialist left. The centrist social-democratic
ex-Chavista governors were practically wiped from the political map.
The rightist winner in Miranda State, Henrique Capriles Radonsky, had
tried to burn down the Cuban embassy during the failed military coup
of April 2002 and the newly elected Governor of Zulia, Pablo Perez,
was the hand picked candidate of the former hard-line rightwing
Governor Rosales.

While the opposition controlled state governorships and municipal
mayors can provide a basis to attack the national government, the
economic crisis will sharply limit the amount of resources available
to maintain services and will increase their dependence on the
federal government. A frontal assault on the Chavez Government
spending state and local funds on partisan warfare could lead to a
decline of federal welfare transfers and would provoke grassroots
discontent. The rightwing won on the basis of promising to improve
state and city services and end corruption and favoritism. Resorting
to their past practices of crony politics and extreme obstructionism
could quickly cost them popular support and undermine their hopes of
transforming local gains into national power. The newly elected
opposition governors and mayors need the cooperation and support of
the Federal Government, especially in the context of the deepening
crisis, or they will lose popular support and credibility.

Conclusion

There is no point in expecting the mass media to recognize the
Socialist victory. Its effort to magnify the significance of the
opposition's 40% electoral vote and their victory in 20% of the
states was predictable. In the post-election period, the Socialists,
no doubt, will critically evaluate the results and hopefully re-think
the selection of future candidates, emphasizing job performance on
local issues over and above professed loyalty to President Chavez and
'Socialism'. The immediate and most pressing task facing the PSUV,
President Chavez, the legislators and the newly elected Chavez
officials is to formulate a comprehensive socio-economic strategic
plan to confront the global collapse of capitalism. This is
especially critical in dealing with the sharp fall in oil prices,
federal revenues and the inevitable decline in government spending.

Chavez has promised to maintain all social programs even if oil
prices remain at or below $50 dollars a barrel. This is clearly a
positive and defensible position if the government manages to reduce
its huge subsidies to the private sector and doesn't embark on any
bailout of bankrupt or nearly bankrupt private firms. While $40
billion dollars in reserves can serve as a temporary cushion, the
fact remains that the government, with the backing of its majorities
in the federal legislature and at the state levels, needs to make
hard choices and not simply print money, run bigger deficits, devalue
the currency and exacerbate the already high rates of annual
inflation (31% as of November).

The only reasonable strategy is to take control of foreign trade and
directly oversee the commanding heights of the productive and
distributive sectors and set priorities that defend popular living
standards. To counter-act bureaucratic ineptness and neutralize lazy
elected officials, effective power and control must be transferred to
organized workers and autonomous consumer and neighborhood councils.

The recent past reveals that merely electing socialist mayors or
governors is not sufficient to ensure the implementation of
progressive policies and the delivery of basic services. Liberal
representative government (even with elected socialists) requires at
a minimum mass popular control and mass pressure to implement the
hard decisions and popular priorities in the midst of a deepening and
prolonged economic crisis.